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With the rapid development of stock pledge in the Chinese capital market,it has 
raised great attention in the public. Stock pledge generally refers to the behavior of 
pledgers (capital demand side, debtor, shareholders) who are willing to pledge some 
of their stocks in listed or non-listed firms to the pledgees (such as banks，security 
firms and investment firms，or trust firms) when applying for a loan，or making a 
mortgage guarantee for a third party’s loan. Compared with other underlying asset 
(such as fixed asset)，stocks are more liquid and can be more easily realized , while 
stock pledge will not result in ownership dilution, thus stock pledge are favored by 
shareholders and financial institutions since it can not only solve the enterprise’s 
financing difficulty but also develop financial institution’s businesses. 
Based on China’s specific institutional background, this study adopts a sample of 
non-financial Chinese listed firms on the A-share market from 2004 to 2015 to 
investigate both the determinants and economic consequences (economic 
consequences include both behavioral consequences and market consequences，the 
former consists of management earnings forecast, earnings management and 
accounting conservatism, while the latter mainly refers to stock price crash risk) of 
controlling shareholders’ stock pledge. Specifically, we study the effects of some 
corporate factors on controlling shareholders’ stock pledge motivation，and further 
explores the effect of controlling shareholders’ stock pledge on management earnings 
forecast，earnings management，accounting conservatism，as well as stock price crash 
risk. 
This study can be divided into eight parts as follows: 
Chapter one introduces the background，motivation， research questions，
framework，content arrangement, innovations and contributions of this research. 
Chapter two makes a brief introduction to stock pledge and literature review. It 
introduces some basic concepts，legal regulations, domestic and overseas market 
conditions of stock pledge, and makes a brief literature review. 
Chapter three investigates the effect of financing constraint, asset collateral value 















Logit, OLS and Tobit models after considering internal and external corporate 
governance as well as external environment factors. 
Chapter four studies the effect of controlling shareholders’ stock pledge on 
management earnings forecast strategies, and mainly investigates the news’ type, 
biases, voluntary and timely properties of management forecast strategies in the 
pre-pledge period, and further examins management forecast strategies characteristics 
during the in-pledge and post-pledge period. 
Chapter five studies the effect of controlling shareholders’ stock pledge on 
earnings management, and mainly examines the existence, approaches (accrual or real 
earnings management) and characteristics (direction and extent) of earnings 
management during the pre-pledge period, and further investigates earnings 
management behaviors during the in-pledge and post-pledge period. 
Chapter six analyzes the influence of controlling shareholders’ stock pledge on 
accounting conservatism in a continuous and dynamic view. Using CScore and Basu 
models to measure accounting conservatism, we conduct a dynamic analysis on 
accounting conservatism during the pre-pledge, in-pledge and post-pledge periods 
from the view point of both cross-sectional and time-series. 
Chapter seven studies the relationship between controlling shareholders’ stock 
pledge and firms’ stock price crash risk , as well as the mediating effects of 
management earnings forecast quality, earnings management and accounting 
conservatism between controlling shareholders’ stock pledge and in-pledge as well as 
post-pledge stock price crash risk. 
Chapter eight summarizes the conclusions and points out the limitations of this 
study as well as future research directions. 
Our empirical research brings about the following main conclusions: 
(i)Financing constraint, asset collateral ability and credit ranking are important factors 
in motivating controlling shareholders’ stock pledge decisions; (ii)Managers of 
pledged firms have strong incentives to issue good news and positive biases in their 
earnings forecasts，so as to help controlling shareholders to gain the stock pledge right 
and get more funding with inflated stock price in the pre-pledge period；(iii) Managers 
do have coordinated with controlling shareholders in conducting both opportunistic 
accrual and real earnings management in the pre-pledge period，and the more 















and real earnings management；(iv) Controlling shareholders’ stock pledge can make 
a significant influence on firms’ accounting conservatism in a continuous dynamic 
process, namely, compared with firms whose controlling shareholders are not pledged，
pledged firms has a lower level of accounting conservatism in the pre-pledge and 
in-pledge period, but a similar level of accounting conservatism in the post-pledge 
period, meanwile, from the perspective of time series analysis, pre-pledge and 
in-pledge conservatism is lower than non-pledge period, while in-pledge conservatism 
is similar to that of pre-pledge, and post-pledge conservatism is significantly higher 
than that of in-pledge;(v) Finally, controlling shareholders’ stock pledge can 
significantly influence stock price crash risk, namely, compared with firms whose 
controlling shareholders are not pledged, pledged firms have lower stock price crash 
risk in the in-pledge period，but will experience an increase in stock price crash risk, 
resulting higher crash risk in the post-pledged period . This ―low crash risk during the 
in-pledge period, high crash risk afterwards‖ situation further manifests that managers 
of the pledged firms do have make such ―delaying tactics‖ as strategic positively 
biased earnings forecasts and positive earnings management to reduce the stock price 
volatility when controlling shareholders are in pledge, and to postpone the coming of 
stock price crashes until controlling shareholders finally terminate their pledge. 
Management earnings forecast, earnings management and accounting 
conservatism are all important areas and topics in accounting research. Management 
earnings forecast belongs to off-the-statement information disclosure, while earnings 
management and accounting conservatism belong to on-the-statement information 
disclosure. There are differences and relationships between earnings management and 
accounting conservatism, the fundamental difference is that earnings management is a 
purposed earnings manipulation activity, while accounting conservatism is an 
endogenous financial reporting system of accounting regimes (Mao and Dai, 2009) , 
meanwhile, their relationship can be shown that accounting conservatism can limit 
earnings management by increasing managers’ manipulation costs, whereas the 
asymmetric recognition principle of gains and losses (more timely and fully  
recognizing ―bad news‖ as ―losses‖) in accounting conservatism can provide 
managers great convenience to under estimate earnings (especially ―big bath‖). 
Different from the existing literature, this study has some improvements and 















Firstly, management earnings forecast is one of the most important corporate 
information disclosure channels. Thus, controlling shareholders and managers may 
collude in opportunistic forecasts，so as to gain some private benefits by manipulating 
stock prices via forecasts. This study firstly provides evidence for ex ante 
management earnings forecast strategies that origin from controlling shareholders’ 
stock pledge in the Chinese setting. 
Secondly, earnings management has been wildly adopted by the managers in 
masking corporate operational performance, while there is no research investigating 
the ex ante earnings management behavior of pledged firms，we extend the research 
perspective from the point view of ―ex post‖ to the point view of ―ex ante‖, so as to 
improve our understanding of earnings management behavior and fill in the research 
gap of existing literature. 
Thirdly, until now, there is no paper systematically explores the relationship 
between controlling shareholders’ stock pledge and accounting conservatism. This 
study tests the dynamic effect of controlling shareholders’ stock pledge on accounting 
conservatism based on data from Chinese listed companies on the A-share market, it 
can not only supplement the existing literature, but also complement and enrich the 
theoretical framework of accounting conservatism. 
Finally, existing literature has studied the relationship between controlling 
shareholders’ stock pledge and stock price crash risk (Xie et al, 2016), but has not 
examined the mechanisms between them, thus, this study can be a beneficial 
supplement to the current research .  
This study has both theoretical and practical significances. Theoretically, it 
enhances our understanding of agency theory,theories of insiders’s (controlling 
shareholders and managers) motivation and behavior，information disclosure theory. 
Practically, it offers policy reference in how to regulate shareholders’ stock pledge so 
as to reduce relevant risk, and in how to protect the interests of pledgees and minority 
shareholders so as to ensure the stability of financial market and the real economy. 
Key words: Controlling Shareholder; Stock Pledge; Determinants; Economic  
Consequences; Management Earnings Forecast; Earnings Management; 
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